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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Appellant might contend that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin holds
contra but a careful analysis of the cases shows that this is a mistake.
The Wisconsin court says: "Where special assessments for public im-
provements are involved, the remedy by appeal is not exclusive." It
may be well to note, however, in passing, that this rule as announced by
the Wisconsin court has been reluctantly followed in obedience to the
doctrine of stare decisis. Certainly it is not necessary to involve the
doctrine of estoppel for when the appellant failed to raise his objection,
he waived all collateral rights thereto." 3
The legality of the assessment cannot now be impeached on the
grounds that the benefits are not immediately reflected in the present
market value of the premises. The lots abutted on the street, as the
facts clearly show. Consequently, the "owner cannot logically contend
that there has not been any material benefits through this improve-
ment." 4
The nation has many cities in which this form of development is
constantly going on. Through this method property is transformed
from its native state and made more desirable for the erection of homes
and factories. Our large cities of today are testimony of the beneficial
changes that have been going on. True, the nature of the improvements
renders it impossible to exact the precise value that has thereby re-
sulted, yet such uncertainty gives no cause for valid objections. Some
property, by its natural state, is necessarily assesed at a figure that is
more than its actual value, yet a conclusion that the assessment is there-
fore void does not follow. "Property that was worthless before may,
by such improvement, become greatly enhanced." 5
We therefore conclude that the property was materially benefited;
that it was thereby subjected to an assessment and that as the owner had
been given the right to statutory objections, he was given due process.
His failure estops him from being heard in the matter and prevents
him from legally saying that he had been denied fundamental rights
under the "laws of the land."6
ALFRED E. LA FRANCE.
Sales: Manufacturers and Dealers impliedly warrant food prod-
ucts free from poison: Flour Manufacturers. liability fort death of
customer of retailer from poison in flour. The plaintiff in the case
of Hertzler v. Manshunm, et al, (Mich. 1924), 2oo N. W. I55, sued for
damages for the death of her husband which was brought about by
arsenic poison contained in flour which was used for bread of which
the deceased partook. The flour was manufactured by one of the de-
fendants and sold to plaintiff by the other defendant, who was a grocer.
The court held that the presence of poison in the flour was prima facie
evidence of negligence and that the manufacturer was liable to the
ultimate consumer for breach of implied warranty for food stuffs
'Kersten v. City of Milwaukee, io9 Wis. 20o; 81 N. W. 948.
'Camp v. City of Davenport, 151 Ia. 38; 13o N. W. 137.
'In re Paving Floyd Park, 196 N. W. 5o7.
'School District Board of Education v. Blodgett, 155 Ill. 441; 4o N. E. 1O25.
NOTES AND COMMENT
purchased from a retailer, the implied warranty of the manufacturer
being that the food is fit and wholesome.
The subject of the liability of the manufacturer of food products to
the ultimate consumer for suffering and injuries caused by foreign or
poisonous substances contained therein, will be divided into the follow-
ing two distinct classes in order that it can more easily be discussed.
(i) Where the liability of the manufacturer arises out of an express
contract relation between the manufacturer and the consumer, and (2)
where there exists no privity between the manufacturer and the con-
sumer or no express contract relationship.
The former class will be given very little consideration because the
law is well established and there exists little or no variance of judicial
opinions on this phase of the subject. In considering this class it will
suffice to say that where there exists an express valid contract between
a manufacturer and a second party with no intervening parties, a breach
of such contract is actionable under the law of contracts. There is
also a theory of recovery based on negligence.
In the latter class there are two recognized theories of recovery for
injuries and suffering caused by foreign or poisonous substances con-
tained in food: viz, (i) on implied warranty, and, (2) negligence in the
performance of a public duty.
In considering the theory of implied warranty, the presumption is
that the particular thing sold to the ultimate consumer is fit for the
purpose for which it was sold and that a manufacturer of foodstuff is
liable to the consumer purchasing from a retailer for the breach of the
implied warranty not withstanding want of privity.2 The consumer
may bring an action in contract.3 The liability of vendors of unwhole-
some food has been treated subject to the rule applicable to the case
of a thing not intrinsically dangerous. 4 But if there is negligence shown,
coupled with an implied warranty, there is a liability charged upon the
manufacturer for injuries caused by bad or unwholesome food, pro-
vided, however, that the manufacturer knew that the condition of the
food was dangerous or that he could have known by proper care.5 If
there is full opportunity for inspection by the purchaser who does not
disclose his specific purpose to the retailer, there is no implied warranty
of fitness.6 This rule is relied upon by some authorities, but the better
rule seems to be that there is an implied warranty where goods are sold
for consumption, because the manufacturer and vendor are bound to
'Baltimore City Pass. R. Co v. Kemp, Tort 36 Cyc. 426.
'Van Brocklin v. Fonda, 12 John 468 (N. Y.).
'Hertzler v. Manshum et al. 200 N. W. 155 *(Mich.) Oct. 1924. In which it
was held that a manufacturer of flour was liable for damages sustained by
consumer who had purchased from a retailer.
'S9imon v. Libby, 114 Ill. App. 258. Plaintiff came to death by eating mince
meat manufactured by defendant. There was no contract relation between the
plaintiff and the defendant; this was held not a good cause of action because the
mince meat was not in itself imminently dangerous.
'Craft v. Parker, 96 Mich. 245, 248; 55 N. W. 812; 21 L. R. A. 139.
'Hight v. Bacon, 126 Mass. 5IO.-
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see to it that the goods are sound and wholesome. Such implied
warranty arises as soon as a sale is made, whether the vendor knows
that the article is intended for immediate use or not.7
There is an implied warranty in every such sale that the thing sold
is fit for the purpose for which it is sold and if it is unfit for such
purpose the vendor is liable in damages on implied warranty.8 Where
the defendant sold hay to the plaintiff on which white lead had been
spilled and this hay was fed to the plaintiff's cow which died, the
plaintiff was awarded a verdict on the theory of breach of implied
warranty.9 A manufacturer is directly liable to the consumer, on the
doctrine of implied warranty, for injuries caused by the unwholesome-
ness of food, although food was purchased from an intermediate dealer
or middleman.' 0 This rule has been extended to one who did not pur-
chase the food but merely partook of it."'
The majority of the cases rely on the theory of negligence in the
performance of a public duty, because they do not recognize the theory
of implied warranty.
Negligence is a breach of legal duty to use due care; and there are
four distinct things that must be shown: (i) A legal duty to use due
care; (2) a negligent failure to discharge this duty; (3) damage to
plaintiff; (4) damage cauaed in a legal sense by defendant's breach
of duty.
The general rule is that a manufacturer or a packer is not liable for
injuries or damages caused by any defect in the packing or manufacture
of commodities placed on the market by him and sold by a retailer, 2 to
"Hoover v. Peter, 18 Mich. 51.
8 Sinclair v. Hathaway, 57 Mich. 6o; Hoover v. Peter 18 Mich. 51.
'French v. Vining, 1O2 Mass. 132; 3 Am. Rep. 404.
"Sahnon v. Libby, 219 Ill. 421; 76 N. E. 573.
" Ketterer v. Armour, 247 Fed. 921; L. R. A. I9i8D 798.
'Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Cannon, 178 S. W. OO9, in which it was
held that tobacco put up in plugs for chewing purposes is not to be considered
as food stuff, and therefore does not come under the exception to the rule that
the manufacturer is liable for any injuries caused by any unwholesome matter
contained therein.
The plaintiff, Cannon, in this case, took a bite of plug of Star-Navy chewing
tobacco which had been manufactured by the defendant company, and in the
course of a few minutes his mouth became sore and swollen. He took the
partly masticated quid from his mouth and found that it contained a large
black bug. His suffering and affliction grew so intense that it necessitated the
calling of a physician to obviate the pain.
The plaintiff was not awarded the verdict because he had failed to show any
negligence in the preparation of the tobacco. Chewing tobacco is not an ex-
ception to the rule and therefore the manufacturer is not liable.
Hasbroch v. Armour & Co. and others, 139 Wis. 357. In this case the plaintiff
became afflicted with paralysis caused by a scratch on the palm of his hand due
to a needle embedded in a bar of soap which had been manufactured by the
defendant. Soap is not an exception to the rule. Verdict for defendant because
the plaintiff failed to show any negligence in the manufacture of the soap.
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one with whom he is not connected by a contract relationship, but foods,
beverages, drugs, or any article for internal consumption are exceptions
to this rule.1
3
There need be no privity shown between the parties where one is
injured by the consuming of unwholesome food,14 because the manu-
facturer or producer is bound to know that the food is wholesome and
not injurious to the stomach of a human being. This liability does not
rest upon implied contract but on the breach of a public duty. 5 It is the
duty of the manufacturer to use the highest degree of care; he is bound
to know that the contents of the container, is fit and wholesome. This
rule is not restricted to the dealer in direct contract relation with him
but is extended to the general public or one not directly a purchaser
from the manufacturer."', Some authorities maintain that this doctrine
can only be applied to those who are the immediate purchasers, but there
are cases which hold that this doctrine applies to any person who may
partake of unwholesome food, drugs or beverages intended for human
consumption."
Where there is government inspection of meat, this does not relieve
"Boyd v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 177 S. W. 80. In this case the plaintiff
became sick from the swallowing of a cigar butt which had been contained in
a bottle of Coca-Cola. The court held that it was not necessary to show any
negligence in the manufacturer or bottling, nor any privity of contract, because
the defendant is liable for the breach of the public duty which duty is to allow
no unwholesomeness in sealed articles of food.
" Van Brocklin v. Fonda, 12 John (N. Y.) 468; 7 Am. Dec. 339.
'Bi~schopp v. Weber, 130 Mass. 411, 417, I N. E. 154; 52 Am. Rep. 715.
"Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 2i, 123; 52 S. E. 152; 1io Am.
Rep. 157; i L. R. A. (N. S.) 1178.
"Crigger v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., (Tenn.) 179 S. V. 155. Held "one
who prepares and puts on the market, in bottles or sealed packages food, drugs,
beverages, medicines, or articles inherently dangerous, owes a high duty to the
public in the care and preparation of such commodities and will be liable without
regard to privity of contract, to anyone injured as a result of his failure properly
to safeguard and perform that duty."
Thomas s,. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397; 59 Am. Dec. 455; in this case it was
held that a druggist was liable to one not the immediate purchaser for injuries
caused by the druggist giving out a jar of belladonna, a deadly poison, in place
of extract of dandelion. The grounds of recovery was based on a breach of
public duty. This case is cited in the following: 139 Wis. 365; 88 Wis. 309; 92
Wis. 645; 9o Wis. 947. Jackson Coca-Cota Bottling Co. v. Chapman, 64 So. 791.
This case is so colorable and so well in point that the writer will copy it 1'crbathn.
"A 'sea' mousie' caused the trouble in this case. The 'wee, sleekit, cow'-
rin', tim'rous beastie' drowned in a bottle of Coca-Cola. No negligence in the
cleaning of the bottle was shown. Nevertheless, the little creature was in the
bottle. It had been there long enough to be swollen and was undergoing decompo-
sition when the bottle was purchased from a grocer and opened by appellant.
Its presence was not discovered until several swallows had been taken. The odor
led to the discovery. Appellee got sick. Suffice to say he did not get joy from
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the packer of the common law duty to the public that the meat is fit and
wholesome and the liability is not shifted to the government. 18
M. T. L.
Master and Servant: Family purpose doctrine in connection with
family automobile.-In the recent case of Payne v. Leininger (Minn.
1924) N. W. 435 the defendant owned a family automobile. His son
was of age but a member of the household and, with the father's per-
mission, took the car for a trip to South Dakota with a young woman
with whom he was keeping company and her mother. The automobile
overturned and the young woman was killed and her mother severely
injured. There was testimony that the purpose of the son and young
woman in going to South Dakota was to be married there. Plaintiff
requested the trial court to charge that if such were the facts the auto-
mobile was in use for a "family purpose." The trial court left the
question to the jury and there was a verdict for defendant. On appeal,
the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in refusing
plaintiff's instruction.
In this class of cases there are two possible theories on which to hold
the owner liable. First, that of master and servant, and second, negli-
gence of the owner in intrusting his automobile to an incompetent
person.
In order to hold the owner liable upon the latter theory, aside from
the master and servant relation, it is essential that he might reasonably
have anticipated the injury as a consequence of permitting the in-
competent person to employ the instrument which produced the injury
and further that the owner's negligence made the injury possible.1
Thus, if a father places his car in charge of a child of tender years he
is liable for the resulting injuries. This rule is not based upon the
theory of imputed negligence but upon his own negligence in intrusting
his automobile to the child.2
the anticipated refreshing drink. He was in the frame of mind to approve the
poet's words:
"The best laid schemes o' mice an' men
Gang oft aglay
An' lea'e us nought but grief an' pain,
For promis'd joy !"
Held, when a manufacturer makes, bottles and sells to the retail trade, to be
again sold to the general public, a beverage represented to be refreshing and
harmless, he is under a legal duty to see to it that in the process of bottling no
foreign substance shall be mixed with the beverage which, if taken into the
human stomach, will be injurious." In this case it was further held that the
bottler owes this duty to the general public for whom his drinks are intended
as well as to the retailer to whom he sells.
"Catani v. Swift Co., 521 Pa. 52; 95 Atl. 391. (1915). The defendant sold
pork which contained trichina of which the plaintiff ate and became sick. Held,
that although the government inspector had passed on this meat the packer still
owed the duty to the public to sell only wholesome and fit meat.
'Allen v. Bland, Tex. Civ. App. (1914) 168 S. W. 35.
'Ferris v. Sterling, 214 N. Y. 249, io8 N. E. 406.
